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COMMENT
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND FEDERAL COMMON
LAW - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Public Nuisance
Suits Concerning Interstate Water Pollution -
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)
INTRODUCTION
N a recent environmental suit the State of Illinois filed a
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint under the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against four cities in Wis-
consin, the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee,
and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of
Milwaukee. The plaintiff requested that the Court abate the
public nuisance being caused by the defendants' daily dis-
charge of over 200,000,000 gallons of raw or inadequately
treated sewage into Lake Michigan in and near the Milwaukee
area. The Court's decision, written by Mr. Justice Douglas,
denied the motion and remitted the parties to the appropriate
federal district court for resolution of the controversy.' While
declining to exercise its original jurisdiction, the Court held
that the appropriate forum for the adjudication of the dispute
was a federal district court. The Court further reasoned that
since the issue of a state-created public nuisance affecting
another state is a federal question 2 and that, in the absence of
a specific substantive statutory remedy,3 the federal question
should be resolved by applying the federal common law of
nuisance.
4
The significance of the decision lies in the Court's juris-
dictional mandate and in its acknowledgement of the validity
of federal common law in the adjudication of an interstate
water pollution issue. The purpose of this comment is to ex-
amine the question of jurisdiction and to show how and why
federal common law was held applicable to the resolution of
this issue in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.
1 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972).
2 Id. at 98-101.
3 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1160 (1970),
does not create the specific remedy for the abatement of interstate
water pollution; The Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401, 407 (1970), specifically exempts sewage from its control. See
also Note, A Comparison of Texas v. Pankey and Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp. Reveals the Necessity for a Federal Common Law Right
to Abate Interstate Pollution, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 183, 191 (1970) for a dis-
cussion on the problems of existing remedies.




The Supreme Court is granted original jurisdiction in a
suit between a state and citizens of another state by the Con-
stitution5 and federal statute.6 Although original and exclusive
jurisdiction is applicable in a controversy between two states,7
the Court has been reluctant to invoke its original jurisdiction
in cases which are not "appropriate."8 The "appropriateness"
of a case for Supreme Court consideration is determined by the
dual test of unavailability of an alternate forum to decide the
case and inability of that forum to fashion adequate relief. 9
When a state brings an action against citizens of another
state, as in the Illinois case,10 another forum is made available
by virtue of federal statute. Although this statute implies that
the federal district court is the appropriate forum," court de-
cisions have split on the issue. In a recent pollution case similar
to the Illinois case, Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.,12 the
state supreme court was deemed the appropriate forum. In
contrast to this holding, a 1907 Supreme Court case concerning
interstate air pollution, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,1 3
granted original jurisdiction in a suit by a state against citizens
of another state.
That it is unlikely the Supreme Court will exercise its
original jurisdiction in such cases appears to have been firmly
established by Wyandotte. The Georgia case was decided over
60 years ago, and its usage with regard to the jurisdiction issue
since that time is nonexistent. When the issue was finally
confronted in Wyandotte, the Court adamantly held that it
was not the appropriate forum for these cases. The Court
5 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (3) (1970).
7 Id. § 1251 (a) (1). See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369
(1963); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
8 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
9 Id.
10 406 U.S. at 97. Political subdivisions, such as the defendants in Illinois,
are considered citizens of the state.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (3) (1970). See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469
(1884), in which the Court held that "we are unable to say that it is not
within the power of Congress to grant to inferior courts of the United
States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by
the Constitution with original jurisdiction." The Court removed this
suit to the federal district court.
12 401 U.S. 493 (1971). See Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Inter-
state Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12
Aiz. L. REv. 691 (1970) for a discussion on the jurisdictional choice
between federal and state courts in connection with this decision and
its impact on interstate pollution cases.
13 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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decided that the Ohio court was equally competent to resolve
the dispute, and, given the awkward nature of interstate pol-
lution cases and the Court's admission that it is hard-pressed
to act competently as a fact finder in original jurisdiction cases,
it felt that a lower court -in this case, the state court-
should decide the dispute.
14
B. Federal Jurisdiction
Assuming, then, that the Supreme Court is not the proper
forum, the issue of where to adjudicate interstate water pol-
lution cases not covered by substantive federal statute must
be evaluated for federal jurisdiction through the diversity of
citizenship 5 and federal question statutes.16 It is important
to note that a state, in an interstate water pollution suit against
citizens of another state, might want to have its own courts
apply its own laws to decide the dispute. However, if the issue
in question involves a federally protected right, the state will
probably be forced to seek relief in a federal forum. Since
there are only two methods of obtaining federal jurisdiction,
diversity of citizenship and the federal question statute, and
the former is inapplicable when a state is one of the parties,I'
a pollution action of the Illinois type must fall within the latter
statute in order to support the Court's holding in Illinois. An
examination of the federal question statute will show how the
decision was made.
1. Federal Question Statute
The federal question statute states that federal district
courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which
the matter in controversy "arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."' 8 Assuming that the monetary
requirement is satisfied, 9 the central issue is whether the
Illinois type of pollution creates an action arising under the
14 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971). See 49 J.
URBAN L. 612 (1971) (comment on the Court's assertion of its modern
role in light of Wyandotte); 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 391 (1971) (approval of
plaintiff's choice of forum in Pankey); 25 U. MIAmi L. REV. 794 (1971)
(discussion on original jurisdiction problem in Wyandotte). However, it
should be noted that Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Wyandotte stresses
the responsibility of the Court to exercise jurisdiction in this type of
case.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
17 A suit between a state and citizens of another state is not one which
will qualify under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Postal Tel. Cable
Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
19 Id. The federal question statute requires that the matter in controversy




"laws" of the United States within the meaning of the statute.
Obviously, a federal statute which provides a suitable remedy
would enable a state to invoke jurisdiction. However, when a
statute does not exist or does not provide the specific remedy
sought, a state, in order to qualify under the federal question
statute, must prove that the right to be protected is a federal




The notion that the right of a state to be free of interstate
water pollution is a federal right has never been explicitly
stated in a judicial decision or federal statute. The first indi-
cation that such a right existed and had a remedy at common
law came in the 1907 decision of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.
The Court held that a state has a legally protected interest to
be free from pollution of its air caused by the citizens of an-
other state.21 The Court reviewed the issue again in Hinderliler
v. LaPlata Co.,22 and, although it did not directly address the
fact that the apportionment of interstate waters was a federal
right, it stated in dictum that the issue was a "question of
'federal common law.' "23
Despite the lack of specific authority on the question of
the state's right as a federal right, it is plausible to argue
that recent federal legislation has designated this right as
federally protected. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
declares that it is federal policy to protect a state's right to
control and prevent water pollution. 24 The National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 196925 lends support to the argument that
protection of the environment - including the state's right in
question -is of federal concern and warrants federal protec-
tion.
The most recent and strongest argument classifying this
state right as a federally protected one is found in the Tenth
Circuit Texas v. Pankey opinion. In discussing the earlier
Georgia case, the Pankey court said:
20 Friendly, In Praise of Erie- and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 385, 410 (1964). See Future of Federal Common Law
(Panel discussion, E. Morgan, Reporter), 17 ALA. L. REv. 10, 16 (1964)
(discussion of two ways to formulate federal common law).
21 206 U.S. at 237: "This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its
capacity as a quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an inter-
est independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth
and air within its domain."
22 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
23 Id. at 110.
24 33 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970).
25 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
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The source or basis for such a quasi-sovereign ecological
right . . . was not discussed, but the right apparently was re-
garded as having existence in the common law .... While the
case cannot be said to have recognized the right as in itself
having a federal source, the Court's holding that a State is en-
titled to federal judicial protection of it from violation by out-
side sources would at least cause it to have a status of direct
protectability and justiciability in relation to the Constitution.
[We think the legal concepts and developments which
have occurred since [Georgia] would presently call for it to be
viewed as one which is within the purview of the [federal
question] statute as being a right entitled to have existence
under federal common law. 26
Thus, it can be said that the state's right, if not technically a
federal right, has at least a sufficient quantum of federal
recognition to qualify as a federally protected right.
b. Federal Common Law
Since the state's ecological right concerning interstate water
pollution appears to be federally protected, an infringement
upon that right in the form of a public nuisance should be
adjudicated by federal law. As in state courts, the federal
forums recognize two kinds of law: statutory and common.
In the absence of a statutory remedy, a federal court can
create federal common law in fashioning an appropriate remedy.
Federal common law as a legal doctrine can be traced
back to the 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson,27 which held that
federal courts exercising diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
were free to create common law as applied to a state. 28 In spite
of the celebrated ruling in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,2 9
which stands for the rejection of the concept of a general
federal common law, the Court's ruling on the same day in
Hinderliler v. LaPlata Co. gave rise to what has been called
specialized federal common law.
30
Of significance in these cases is the tendency of the federal
courts to recognize federal common law only when there is
a federal right involved. The plaintiff's right in Erie was a
personal right protected by state law; under the diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction exercised by the federal court in the
ease, that right was properly adjudicated under state law.
26 Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971).
2741 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842).
28 Id. at 18.
29 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30 Friendly, supra note 20, at 405: "The clarion yet careful pronounce-
ment of Erie, 'There is no federal general common law,' opened the
way to what, for want of a better term, we may call specialized federal
common law."
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In contrast, the right in Hinderliler was the right of the state
in connection with the apportionment of water in interstate
streams. The Court's dictum stating that a controversy involv-
ing this right of a state is a question of federal common law
is justified independently of the holding in Erie.
The tendency to recognize specialized federal common law
is borne out strongly in the decision of Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States.3 1 The Court there held that since the rights of
the federal government are governed by federal law, the courts
can fashion federal common law in the absence of an applicable
federal statute.32 This trend was further clarified by the decision
of Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 33 in which it was held that
a federal court can create federal common law if a federal right
is at issue.
34
Once it is established that federal common law offers a
cause of action where a federal right is involved, it is still
necessary to show that federal common law comes within the
meaning of the federal question statute. The first indication
that it could be so considered appeared in the dissent in
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. 35 Mr. Justice
Brennan stated that since causes of action based on admiralty
law are created by federal common law, these cases come under
the "laws" of the federal question statute.
36
The breakthrough on this issue came in the decision of
Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph
Co.3 7 The Second Circuit held that, in the absence of a statu-
tory remedy,"8 not only are claims for negligence and breach
of contract with regard to interstate communications services
governed by federal common law, but that the word "laws"
in the federal question statute should be construed to include
laws created by federal judicial decisions as well as those
created by federal legislation. 39 Thus, Brennan's theory as
31 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
32 Id. at 366, 367.
33 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
:34 Id. at 456.
35 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
31" Id. at 393. Mr. Justice Brennan al,-o cites Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955): "[I]n the absence of controlling
acts of Congress this Court has fashioned a large part of the existing
rules that govern admiralty."
37 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
:38 Id. at 491. The court held that federal legislation had pre-empted the
field of interstate service by communication carriers, but "[w]here
neither the Communications Act itself nor the tariffs filed pursuant to
the Act deals with a particular question, the courts are to apply a uni-
form rule of federal common law." Id.
31) Id. at 492.
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stated in his Romero dissent became the majority view in Ivy
Broadcasting, and federal common law based on federal rights
outside the admiralty area came within the meaning of the
statutory language.
Having proved that federal common law is deemed to have
existence within the meaning of the federal question statute,
all that a state involved in an interstate water pollution dis-
pute must do is look to the decision in Texas v. Pankey40 for
the definitive opinion sanctioning federal common law and
federal jurisdiction in this area. In Pankey, the state sought
to enjoin the defendants, citizens of New Mexico, from using
a certain pesticide which was threatening to pollute an inter-
state stream and affect the plaintiff's use and enjoyment
thereof.41 The court held that the public nuisance involving
the ecological rights of the state are to be adjudicated under
federal common law, and therefore, federal jurisdiction of the
district court could properly be invoked under the federal
question statute.42 Thus, given Pankey and the preceding cases,
one should be able to prove that the state's right is a "federal
right" protected by federal common law to be created by a
federal district court.
II. THE Pankey-Wyandotte CONFLICT
The appropriate forum and federal common law issues
connected with federal jurisdiction appeared to be well set-
tled by Pankey. But the Supreme Court's decision of Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. created confusion and despair among
environmentalists with regard to interstate water pollution. Not
only did the Court, in its refusal to exercise original jurisdic-
tion,43 remit the parties to the state court for adjudication of
the issues, but it also implied disapproval of the validity of
federal common law to govern a fact situation similar to that
in Pankey.
44
Federal jurisdiction was not granted in Wyandotte because
the Court did not think the state's right was a federal right
or the public nuisance issue one to be adjudicated under federal
common law. The Court stated that the public nuisance issue,
40 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
41 Id. at 238, 239.
42 Id. at 240.
43 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971). The Court's
concern with its primary responsibility as an appellate tribunal and its
fear of possible abuse of the opportunity to resort to its original juris-
diction in suits of this nature prompted the exercise of its discretion to
deny original jurisdiction. See note 14 supra.
44 The only significant difference between the two cases is that in Wyan-
dotte the interstate waterway was Lake Erie.
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being involved in local law, could more properly be resolved
by the Ohio Supreme Court, especially since no important prob-
lems of federal law were involved.
45
The conflict between Pankey and Wyandotte becomes most
confusing when one considers that the Court in Wyandotte dis-
missed the federal common law issue in a dictum footnote:
[Tihis particular case cannot be disposed of by transferring it
to an appropriate federal district court since this [diversity of
citizenship] statute by itself does not actually confer jurisdic-
tion on these courts . . . and no other statutory jurisdictional
basis exists .... Nor would federal question jurisdiction exist
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. So far as it appears from the present
record, an action such as this, if otherwise cognizable in fed-
eral district court, would have to be adjudicated under state
law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).46
The Court did not explain its decision with regard to the no-
tion of the state's federally protected right. Although Pankey
was not specifically overruled, the Court's pronouncement that
state law should govern the dispute created an irreconcilable
conflict 47 with the Pankey holding on both the federal right
and federal common law issues.
III. THE CONFLICT RESOLVED
The conflict that the Pankey and Wyandotte decisions cre-
ated has been resolved by Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.
A. The Appropriate Forum
The Court resolved the issue of the proper forum for ad-
judication of a public nuisance suit concerning interstate water
pollution by construing article III of the Constitution
48 and
the federal question statute
49 to declare that original juris-
diction will be declined where another court has the authority
to decide the dispute.5 0 While apparently following the rationale
in Wyandotte with regard to the problems inherent in original
jurisdiction, the Court stated that the federal district court is
the proper forum if the defendants can be sued in a federal
court.51 Thus, the holding in Wyandotte that federal courts
would not exercise jurisdiction in this type of suit was revised.
B. Federal Common Law
Having selected the appropriate forum, the Court then
45 401 U.S. at 498-500.
46 Id. at 498.
47 For a discussion of this conflict, see Note, Federal Common Law and
Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REv. 439 (1972); Note, supra note 3, at
186-98.
48 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
49 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
50406 U.S. at 93-94.
51 Id. at 98.
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held that the public nuisance involves a federal right to be
adjudicated by federal common law- the prerequisites neces-
sary to invoke jurisdiction under the federal question statute.
The Court cited Georgia and Hinderliler to imply that
the state's ecological right can effectively be classified as a
federal right.52 Being cognizant of the trend in recent federal
environmental legislation of declaring the national environment
to be federally protected, the Court merely clarified the con-
cept of the state's right as a federal right and overruled the
basis upon which Wyandotte was decided.
With the federal right issue resolved, the Court sanctioned
the Pankey rationale on the federal common law issue and
cited Ivy Broadcasting and Pankey as authority for its ruling.
The Court stated that when the state's right is infringed upon
by public nuisance, the dispute is to be governed by "the ap-
plicable federal common law [depending] on the facts peculiar
to the particular case."
'53
The Illinois case thus resolved the conflict between Wyan-
dotte and Pankey by adopting a portion of each decision. From
Pankey the Court took the holding which validated federal
common law, and from Wyandotte it accepted the decision to
avoid original jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Illinois was aware of the temporary nature
of its decision:
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal
regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common
law of nuisance. But until that time comes to pass, federal
courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits
alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution.
5 4
However limited this decision may be, it represents a clear
statement of principles of law and procedure which will have
a significant impact on future environmental litigation.
A. The Decision and the Role of Equity
The traditional remedy for a public nuisance is an in-
junction; yet, the Court's final remedy in Illinois is less than
unwavering: "There are no fixed rules that govern; these will
be equity suits in which the informed judgment of the chan-
cellor will largely govern. ' 55 A court sitting in equity will
undoubtedly take into consideration the economic and political
52 Id- at 104-05.
53 Id. at 106.
54 Id. at 107.
55 Id. at 107-08.
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aspects of the controversy before it. There is the possibility
that the flexibility of injunctive relief may, in some instances,
weaken the impact of a pro-environmental verdict.56 It is
equally possible that equity may fashion remedies more appro-
priate than an injunction.
B. Impact of the Decision
The Illinois decision stands for the fact that federal com-
mon law will be used or created to resolve this aspect of inter-
state water pollution. The need for a relatively uniform body
of law, consistent with the avowed federal policy of protecting
the environment, is potentially satisfied by this decision. There
may be some concern over the ability of a court to decide the
complex issues involved in litigation of this nature,57 but most
commentators have faith in the role of the courts in this area.58
Future litigation will indicate the true measure of a court's
capacity to deal with this type of suit.
The most encouraging aspect of Illinois is the specificity
with which the Court lays down the mandate of federal dis-
trict court jurisdiction and the use of the appropriate theory
of law. How much litigation this decision will precipitate is
unknown, but if a state is harmed by interstate water pollu-
tion and seeks a remedy, that state is now assured that its prob-
lem is of enough importance to the well-being of the national
environment to be dealt with as a federal question and to be
resolved by federal common law.
Richard A. Sherman
56 The Court may have been wary of the adverse effects of an absolute
injunction similar to the one issued in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907), where it was stated that the "possible disaster to
those outside the State must be accepted as a consequence of her stand-
ing on her extreme rights." Id. at 239. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 309, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970)
(example of the flexible nature of injunctive relief in a nuisance case).
57 For a discussion of the limitations of the courts, see Note, The Role of
Courts in Technology Assessment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1970).
58 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 473, 566 (1970): "[T]he courts,
in their own intuitive way - sometimes clumsy and cumbersome -
have shown more insight and sensitivity to many of the fundamental
problems of resource management than have any of the other branches
of government."
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